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Out of Balance: Wrong Turns in Public
Employee Speech Law
Michael Toth
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 346
ABSTRACT
Although scholars offer a variety of explanations for the modern Supreme Court’s
public employee speech jurisprudence, they share a common presumption.
According to the standard account, the modern era of public employee free speech
law began in 1968, with the Court’s adoption of a balancing test in Pickering v.
Board of Education. Contrary to this view, this Article argues that Pickering
balancing is better characterized as a relic from a bygone era rather than the start of a
new one. Balancing was once the Court’s standard method of judging First
Amendment claims. When Pickering was decided, however, balancing was under
attack. Consistent with the overall demise of free speech balancing, this Article
shows that the Court began abandoning Pickering balancing the moment the standard
was announced. Pickering itself was not decided on balancing grounds, and the
public employee speech cases that followed it in the Supreme Court have avoided
balancing. When Pickering is put into proper perspective, it is possible to identify an
overlooked explanation for the modern Court’s public employee speech rulings. This
Article tells the story of how the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, unbeknownst
to courts and commentators fixated on Pickering balancing, has been the true driving
force behind a major area of First Amendment law for nearly fifty years.
AUTHOR NOTE
Michael Toth is a Fellow at Stanford Constitutional Law Center. He would like to
thank Michael McConnell, Jud Campbell, Joel Lumer, and Joseph Toth for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts on this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

O

liver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously remarked that a policeman
“may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.”1 Public employee free speech
doctrine has undoubtedly evolved since Holmes’s day, but exactly how
is disputed. Commentators have pointed to numerous principles behind
the modern Supreme Court’s public employee speech jurisprudence:
the government-speech doctrine,2 categorical balancing,3 neoformalism,4 the managerial prerogative,5 the return of the privilege
doctrine,6 the increasing privatization of the public workplace,7 and
policy preferences.8
This Article offers an alternative account. It argues that the modern
Court for the most part has applied the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to speech restrictions on public employment. And when the
Court has relied on other principles, it has remained faithful to the
essential logic of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Under this
analytical framework, the dispositive factor is whether the condition—
the speech infringement—is germane to the public benefit—
government employment.
Although scholars posit different theories to explain the Supreme
Court’s current doctrine, they share a common presumption. The
consensus view maintains that the modern era of public employee free
speech law began in 1968, with the Court’s opinion in Pickering v.
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of
Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009).
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and
§ 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008).
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an
Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173 (2007).
Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008).
Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907 (2011).
Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First
Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2013).
Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association
Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1064-67
(2013) (concluding that “the only robust free speech rights government
employees have is [sic] the right to refuse to support unions”).
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Board of Education.9 The Pickering framework, to be sure, sounds
nothing like an unconstitutional conditions test. “The problem in any
case,” the Pickering Court asserted, “is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.”10 Commentators read Pickering as
requiring an open-ended, fact-dependent inquiry.11 The dispositive
factor is the weight of the burden on speech compared with that of the
asserted public interest.12 Unconstitutional conditions analysis, by
contrast, turns on the relationship between a means—the
unconstitutional condition—and an end—the benefit subject to the
condition.13 The approaches are quite distinct. One depends on
relatedness, the other on significance.
Contrary to the standard account, this article argues that
Pickering’s balancing standard belongs to the bygone era of free
speech balancing that began in the 1930s. During its heyday in the
1950s and early 1960s, balancing was the Court’s standard approach
for resolving First Amendment challenges.14 When Pickering was
decided, however, free speech balancing was under attack from
9

10

11

12
13

14

Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free
Speech, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5, 7 (1999) (characterizing Pickering as the
Supreme Court’s “first modern public employee-free speech case”); see also,
Norton, supra note 2, at 8-10 (tracing “longstanding test for assessing” public
employee speech claims back to Pickering); Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1176-77
(asserting that Pickering began the era of constitutional protection for public
employee speech).
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968).
Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1177 (describing Pickering balancing test as “ad hoc”
and “fact- dependent”); Schoen, supra note 9, at 8 (characterizing the Court’s
balancing approach in Pickering as “highly fact-intensive”); Paul Ferris
Solomon, The Public Employee’s Right of Free Speech: A Proposal for A Fresh
Start, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 449, 453 (1986) (referring to Pickering balancing test
as “open-ended”).
See Solomon, supra note 11, at 453.
See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413 (1989) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions analysis in length
and its many applications throughout first amendment jurisprudence).
See Solomon, supra note 11, at 450-52 (discussing the cases leading up to the
seminal decision in Pickering).
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members of the Court and academics. Balancing no longer survives as
a general First Amendment doctrine.15
Consistent with the overall demise of free speech balancing, the
Court began departing from Pickering balancing in the public
employment context essentially the moment the standard was
articulated. Pickering itself was not decided on balancing grounds, and
the public employee speech cases that followed it in the Supreme
Court essentially pay lip service to the balancing standard. The inquiry
has largely shifted to the relationship between the speech restriction
and the privilege of public employment. This doctrinal development is
obscured, to be sure, by the salience of the public-concern test, which
the Court derived from the language of Pickering’s balancing standard
and has applied in several public employee speech cases. This test,
however, can be easily recast in unconstitutional conditions terms, and
would make more sense doctrinally if formulated in this way. The
Court’s public employee speech decisions since Pickering, in short,
have followed the arc of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
With this claim in mind, this Article proceeds according to the
following outline. Part II describes the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. This section explains that the doctrine emerged as a judicial
device designed to ensure that the government does not exceed the
boundaries of its lawful discretion over the provision of public
benefits. Using the doctrine, the early twentieth-century Court
permitted the state to impose restrictions on the receipt of public
benefits where the reason for the restriction was related to the reason
that the state created the public benefit in the first place. In other
words, the doctrine did not force the state to compromise the
legitimate policy behind a benefit. Provided that the condition was
germane to the same ends that the state was pursuing through the
benefit, it was safe. The doctrine precluded the state, however, from
leveraging a gratuitous benefit to achieve unconstitutional ends
unrelated to the reason behind the benefit.
15

In United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), the Court rejected the balance
of interest test as a “startling and dangerous” method for determining whether
speech is protected under the First Amendment. “The First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech,” the Court explained, “does not extend only to
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and
benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the
costs.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.

2015

Wrong Turns in Public Employee Speech Law

351

Part III discusses the balancing test. When the first public
employee speech case reached the Court in 1947, the emerging view
on the Court of First Amendment law was pragmatic. Rather than
apply the existing unconstitutional conditions doctrine to restrictions
on the privilege of public employment, the Court essentially created a
new, and controversial, free speech doctrine. Part IV revisits
Pickering. This section shows that the majority opinion followed the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine discussed in Part II. Lower courts
and commentators misinterpret Pickering as requiring a balance of
interest test. The balancing standard articulated in the case is pure
dicta. Part V surveys the post-Pickering landscape. It divides the
Court’s public employee free speech doctrine into four categories of
cases, and demonstrates the relevance of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in three of these categories. In the fourth
category—cases concerning public employees who are disciplined for
controversial or insubordinate remarks—the Court has relied on the
public-concern and citizen-speaker tests. Each of these tests can and
should be replaced with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Part
VI offers concluding remarks.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE—AN
OVERVIEW
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine regulates the
government’s power to bargain. When the government bargains, it
does not impose a fine, imprisonment, or any other sanction on
individuals who refuse the deal. It offers terms and conditions that may
be accepted or rejected. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
addresses conditions that require the recipient of a public benefit to
forfeit a constitutional right.16

16

Not every condition triggers the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Where no
constitutional right is forfeited, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has no
place. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 60, 70 (2006) (holding that the Solomon Amendment’s conditional funding
provision is not an unconstitutional condition because the First Amendment
would not prevent Congress from directing the schools to provide equal access
to military recruiters); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 323 (1935) (“If a state has power
to impose a certain requirement by direct penal sanction, it can impose it as a
condition to the grant of a privilege.”).
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Before the emergence of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
courts upheld the imposition of unconstitutional conditions under the
privilege doctrine. This now defunct doctrine was expressed as early
as 1791, when the First Congress debated whether to prohibit federal
excise tax collectors from electioneering.17 Representative Joshua
Seney of New Hampshire argued that the law did not violate speech
rights because “it would be optional to accept the offices or not.”18
Others took the opposite view that the proposal was “unconstitutional,
as it will deprive [excise officers] of speaking and writing their minds;
a right of which no law can divest them.”19 Representative Fisher
Ames of Massachusetts complained that the electioneering ban “will
muzzle the mouths of freemen.”20 The Bill of Rights had not even
been ratified, yet there were First Amendment problems already.
The privilege doctrine started from the premise that government
benefits are “optional.”21 The government has no obligation to provide
them in the first place. Adherents to the doctrine reasoned that because
the government has the “greater” power of declining to offer a benefit,
it also has the “lesser” power of offering benefits but with strings
attached.22 Even conditions that required the beneficiary to forfeit a
constitutional liberty, such as the right to attend a political rally in the
case of Holmes’s policeman, were permissible under the privilege
doctrine.23

17
18
19
20
21

22

23

2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1926 (1791).
Id.
Id. at 1925.
Id. at 1926.
Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876) (holding that a state law
permitting a foreign corporation to conduct business locally on the condition
that it abstain from removing cases to federal court was constitutional because
the law “gives the company the option” of accepting such terms).
W. Union Tel. Co. v. State of Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 54 (1910) (“I
confess my inability to understand how a condition can be unconstitutional
when attached to a matter over which a state has absolute arbitrary power.”)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897)
(sustaining a city ordinance that required a permit to speak on public property on
the ground that the city’s “right to absolutely exclude all right to use necessarily
includes the authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be
availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser”).
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1892); Davis, 167 U.S. at
48 (upholding condition that restricted speech on public property).
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine shares the same
conceptual foundation as the privilege doctrine. It takes for granted
that government benefits are a privilege that need not be offered at
all.24 Unlike the privilege doctrine, however, proponents of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine contend that, under certain
circumstances, the government may not condition a privilege on the
waiver of a constitutional right.25 A brief recounting of the
development of the doctrine elucidates the special circumstances that
render a condition unconstitutional.
In its early formulation, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
prohibited conditions that burdened a constitutional right. In the 1926
case of Frost v. Railroad Commission, for example, the Supreme
Court held that a state could not condition the commercial use of
public highways on compliance with regulations governing common
carriers.26 The majority explained that the restriction threatened the
viability of commercial truckers, who needed to use the highways to
stay in business but could not afford to operate as common carriers.27
The Court’s rationale, however, applied on its face to unconstitutional
conditions of all degrees of magnitude. “A state is without power,”
Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority, “to impose an
unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege.”28
Other Supreme Court opinions were equally unequivocal.29
24

25
26

27

28
29

William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445 (1968) (describing common
ground between unconstitutional conditions doctrine and privilege doctrine).
See id.
Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (1926). Common carriers
were generally subject to broader regulatory controls than private carriers. In
Frost, the state railroad commission was empowered to fix the rates and fares of
common carriers, and impose other conditions that it regarded as necessary for
public convenience. Id. at 590.
In the words of the majority, the statute left contract carriers with “a choice
between the rock and the whirlpool—an option to forego a privilege which may
be vital to his livelihood or submit to a requirement which may constitute an
intolerable burden.” Id. at 593.
Id. at 598.
See, e.g., Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532-33 (1922) (holding that
a state’s power to deny a benefit “is subject to the limitations of the supreme
fundamental law”); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918)
(stating that “a constitutional power cannot be used to accomplish an
unconstitutional end).
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Arguments from the state that unconstitutional conditions were
sometimes incidental to the state’s legitimate regulatory authority
persuaded the Court in Stephenson v. Binford to qualify the doctrine.30
At first blush, the condition on public road use in Stephenson appears
indistinguishable from the restriction held to infringe
unconstitutionally on the due process rights of commercial truckers in
Frost. The law in Frost required truckers to do business as common
carriers.31 The statute in Stephenson forbade truckers, among other
things, from charging lower shipping rates than the competitor
common carriers charged.32 Both regimes, in short, prevented truckers
from doing business on their own terms.
In Frost, however, the Court was bound by the conclusion in the
ruling below construing the statute not to be a regulation of the use of
the highways.33 The Court understood the statute instead as an attempt
to leverage the state’s authority over the use of public roads to convert
private carriers into common carriers.34 Under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, states could not impose common
carrier status on private shippers by mere legislative fiat.35 The state
did not challenge this rule in Frost.36 The “naked question” in the case,
then, was whether the state could achieve the same end “by imposing
the unconstitutional requirement as a condition precedent to the
enjoyment of a privilege.”37
In Stephenson, by contrast, the ruling below upheld the minimum
rate requirement as a valid exercise of the state’s regulatory authority
over the use of the public roadways.38 Justice Sutherland, writing again
for the majority, agreed. Public roads, he explained, existed primarily
30
31
32
33

34

35
36
37
38

Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
Frost, 271 U.S. at 589-90, 592.
Stephenson, 287 U.S. at 261-62.
Id. at 275 & n. 1 (citing pertinent section from Frost and quoting the state
supreme court opinion).
Frost, 271 U.S. at 592 (describing case at hand as “that of a private carrier, who,
in order to enjoy the use of the highways, must submit to the condition of
becoming a common carrier”).
Id. at 592 (citing cases).
Id.
Id. at 592.
Stephenson v. Binford, 53 F.2d 509, 515-16 (S.D. Tex. 1931) (affirming statute
as having the regulatory purpose of creating a “safe and dependable” system of
transportation).
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for the public at large.39 The preferred use of the state’s roadways was
as a means of transport for private motorists, not as a place of business
for commercial shippers.40 To preserve the roads for their primary
function, the state could go as far as prohibiting truckers altogether
from using publically-subsidized roads.41 The conditions on
commercial use at issue in Stephenson, Sutherland further reasoned,
were constitutional because they conserved the roads for public use.42
Stephenson teaches several important lessons about the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine that remain true today. First,
contrary to the initial articulation of the doctrine, not every
unconstitutional condition makes a government action illegitimate.
The validity of a condition depends on “germaneness.”43 A germane
condition is one that serves the same policy ends that are responsible
for the existence of the benefit itself.44 In Stephenson, the benefit—
public roads—existed primarily for the purpose of providing the public
a means of transportation. The Court permitted the price floors on
commercial carriers once it deemed this restriction to be operating in
furtherance of the benefit’s animating purpose.45
Second, Stephenson demonstrates that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine determines how closely a challenged restriction
will be scrutinized. The plaintiffs in Stephenson argued that the rate
controls infringed upon their due process rights.46 The controlling rule
39
40
41
42

42
43

44

45
46

Stephenson, 287 U.S. at 264.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 272-74 (determining that the price controls had a “definite tendency to
relieve the highways” of commercial traffic and therefore were a “means to the
legitimate ends of conserving the highways”).
Id. at 272.
See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee
Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1985, 2011-12 (2012); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1458-68 (1989); Hale,
supra note 16, at 350-59.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (providing that a condition that
furthers the purposes of a federal grant program does not violate constitutional
rights); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987)
(explaining that the state had the right to prohibit or condition construction
provided that the restriction served to protect the public’s view of the beach).
Stephenson, 287 U.S. at 272-74.
Id. at 263.
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on rate controls provided that a state lacked the power to impose price
floors on private businesses unless the regulated entities fit within the
narrow category of businesses “affected with a public interest.”47 Most
likely, Justice Sutherland would have voted to strike the law had he
applied this rule.48
Justice Sutherland expressly confined his inquiry, however, to the
separate question of whether the rate controls were a legitimate use of
the state’s power to conserve the public roadways.49 Once he
determined that the rate controls were germane to the state’s power to
regulate the public roads, the Justice applied a different, more
deferential standard of review.50 All that was necessary to sustain the
rate controls was an “actual” relationship, regardless of the degree,
between the reason for the price floors and the reason for the provision
of public roads.51 The rate restrictions passed this test.
In the public employment context, as we shall see, the
germaneness inquiry determines the threshold question of whether the
First Amendment applies. Restrictions that are germane to the purpose
of the public employment in question are not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny, while non-germane speech restrictions are.
Understanding that the germaneness inquiry is a threshold
determination helps in spotting when the Court has (and hasn’t) relied
on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Finally, Stephenson illustrates that the standard of review for
determining whether a condition is germane has long been subject to
some ambiguity. Justice Sutherland raised two potentially relevant
factors in drawing the line between germane and non-germane
conditions: (1) the closeness of the relationship between the condition

47

48

49
50
51

Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430
(1927).
According to Robert Hale, there was “little doubt” that Justice Sutherland would
have stricken the rate controls had he regarded them as non-germane to the
state’s interest in highways conservation. Hale, supra note 16 at 349 (relying on
Sutherland’s opinions invalidating rate controls in Williams v. Standard Oil Co.,
278 U.S. 235 (1929) and Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), as well as the
justice’s dissent in the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the price floors in
Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
Stephenson, 287 U.S. at 265.
Id. at 272.
Id.
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and the legitimate ends that the condition purports to serve,52 and (2)
the relative significance of the legitimate ends within the context of the
benefit subject to the condition.53 Stephenson set a minimal threshold
with regard to the first factor.54 With regard to the second factor,
however, Sutherland emphasized that the transportation of the public
was the primary reason for which public highways were constructed.55
Was a closer relationship between means and ends required where the
desired ends were not so crucial to the existence of the public benefit?
Stephenson does not say.
Since Stephenson, moreover, the Court has not been entirely
consistent in how it has defined the line between germane and nongermane conditions. In the 1976 case of Elrod v. Burns, for example, a
plurality of the Court maintained that an unconstitutional restriction on
government privileges was valid only if it furthered some vital
government ends by the means least restrictive of constitutionally
protected rights.56 More recently, the Court has articulated a less
exacting standard. Under this standard, conditions that advance the
purpose of the benefit, rather than a vital governmental ends, are
permissible.57 At the same time, the modern Court demands a stronger
connection between ends and means than the minimal relationship
required under Stephenson. It has stated that an “essential nexus” must
exist between an unconstitutional condition and a legitimate end.58
Conditions that have only “little” relevance to the reason behind the
public benefit, furthermore, are now regarded as non-germane.59
III. THE BALANCING TEST
The public employment speech cases from the pre-Pickering era
are commonly viewed as something of a lagging indicator, a holdout
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 264, 271.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991).
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (maintaining that a condition
is invalid where there is “little or no connection” between the constitutional
infringement and the public benefit).
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from the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in cases dealing with non-employment public
benefits. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court renounced the
privilege doctrine in the 1920s, scholarship on public employee speech
law gives the impression that the justices carved an exception for
public employees, who continued to work on the government’s terms,
unconstitutional conditions included, until the 1960s.60
The standard account correctly identifies in the pre-Pickering era a
considerable degree of deference to the state, but it gets the source of
the Court’s deference wrong, mistakenly identifying the persistence of
the privilege doctrine where the pre-Pickering Court’s free speech
jurisprudence was the culprit. The Court’s general approach in First
Amendment cases during this era was to weigh the interest of
individual speakers against the public interest. The Court’s proponents
of balancing, moreover, regarded political actors to be in a better
position to strike the appropriate balance between competing societal
interests. As a result, balancing generally favored regulation.
A. Schneider v. State of New Jersey
The era of First Amendment balancing began innocuously enough.
In 1939, the Court in Schneider v. State heard a challenge to several
municipal ordinances that restricted the use of public streets for the
purpose of distributing handbills, pamphlets, and other printed
materials.61 Before addressing the particulars of the challenged
ordinances, the Court drew a distinction between lawful regulations of
conduct that have the indirect effect of restricting speech—it gave the
example of a traffic regulation that may be used to arrest a speaker
who “take[s] his stand in the middle of a . . . crowded street”—and
unlawful regulations of speech.62 After introducing the conduct-speech
dichotomy, the Court offered the following guidance:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights
is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the
60

61
62

Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2007) (providing
that the privilege doctrine controlled cases involving restrictions on public
employment until Pickering); Kathryn B. Cooper, Garcetti v. Ceballos: The
Dual Threshold Requirement Challenging Public Employee Free Speech, 8 LOY.
J. PUB. INT. L. 73, 74 (2006) (same).
See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
Id. at 160-61.
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challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the
delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
63
rights.

The last sentence would be interpreted as an invitation, in each
case, to balance the competing interests in speech, on the one hand,
and the maintenance of social order, on the other.64 Taken in context,
however, it is an unlikely candidate for a doctrinal shift. After the
Court made the statement, it went on to strike down the ordinances as
insufficiently tailored to the reasons asserted in support of restricting
handbill distribution.65 The justices did not actually take up the
“delicate” task of “weighing the circumstances.”
B. Mitchell, Douds, and Dennis
A trilogy of Supreme Court opinions made the use of the balancing
test more explicit. The first two cases presented the classic
unconstitutional conditions problem. The laws in question did not
directly prohibit speech; they imposed a speech restriction as a
condition on a public benefit. In both cases, United Public Workers of
America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell and American Communications
Association, C.I.O., v. Douds, the Court ignored the germaneness
inquiry central to unconstitutional conditions analysis. The justices

63
64

65

Id. at 161.
Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950) (citing
Schneider as support for the application of a balance of interest test to a speech
restriction attached as a condition to the receipt of a government benefit).
Three of the ordinances made it unlawful to circulate handbills on public streets;
the fourth prohibited door-to-door solicitation without a police permit.
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 154-58. The bans on circulation were justified on antilittering grounds, id. at 162, while the permit requirement was defended as a
fraud protection measure. Id. at 159. The police-power theory behind the
circulation ban failed because, as the Court dryly put it, “There are obvious
methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who
actually throw papers on the streets.” Id. at 162. Similarly, the Court found that
laws against fraud and trespass were sufficient to remove any justification for
the permit requirement. Id. at 164.
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instead determined the constitutionality of the condition under a
balancing test.
In Mitchell, decided in 1947, the Court declared that to resolve a
challenge brought against the Hatch Act’s ban on federal employees
taking an active part in political campaigns, it was necessary to
“balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom against a
congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the
supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees of
government.”66 The statute would be evaluated, therefore, on whether
the benefit of the speech restriction outweighed the burden, not on
whether the restriction was a necessary means to a non-First
Amendment end.67 By jettisoning the germaneness inquiry of earlier
unconstitutional conditions cases, Mitchell charted a new path for
public employee speech cases.
As deployed in Mitchell, the balancing test was deferential to
Congress. The majority maintained that the legislature had the primary
responsibility for determining how much to regulate the political
conduct of federal employees,68 and found no reason to second guess
Congress’s judgment that the Hatch Act was necessary to maintain the
integrity and competency of the federal workforce.69 Concerns as to
the statute’s breadth were dismissed as “matters of detail for
Congress.”70 Mitchell relegated the courts to ensuring that regulations
of public employees’ political conduct did not “pass[] beyond the
general existing conception of governmental power.”71 The majority
66

67
68
69
70
71

United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947).
Petitioners in Mitchell were federal employees. The justices followed the
doctrinal trend and declined to invoke the privilege doctrine. The majority
acknowledged instead that the Bill of Rights protects government employees. Id.
at 94-95 (stating that the Hatch Act interfered “with what otherwise would be
the freedom of the civil servant under the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments”);
id. at 100 (providing that Congress may not “enact a regulation providing that no
Republican, Jew, or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal
employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work”).
Although Mitchell sustained the Hatch Act, the decision “was not put upon the
ground that government employment is a privilege to be conferred or withheld at
will.” Douds, 339 U.S. at 405.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 95-96.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 102.
Id.
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defined that phrase—it does not appear in prior state or federal case
law—as the product of “practice, history, and changing education,
social and economic conditions,”72 suggesting that when engaging in
balancing, judges should defer to societal and economic trends as well
as longstanding political arrangements.73
Three years later, the Court in Douds addressed the antiCommunist affidavit requirement in the Taft-Hartley Act. The
provision excluded from the benefits of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) unions led by officers who refused to renounce
Communism.74 Confronted with another unconstitutional conditions
problem, the Court turned again to the balancing test. This time,
however, the Court went further than it had in Mitchell and adopted
interest balancing as the correct framework for resolving constitutional
challenges to conditions on government privileges. “When particular
conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech,” Chief
Justice Vinson wrote for the majority, “the duty of the court is to
determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater
protection under the particular circumstances presented.”75 As in
Mitchell, the Court was not inclined to question Congress’s judgment
that the challenged provision addressed a substantial harm, or to
quibble with the chosen means.76 Once again, the scales tipped in
Congress’s favor.
72
73

74
75
76

Id.
As evidence that the Hatch Act was within the “general existing conception of
government power,” Mitchell asserted that the prohibition on political activity
“has the approval of long practice by the [United States Civil Service]
Commission, court decisions upon similar problems and a large body of
informed public opinion.” Id. at 102-03.
Douds, 339 U.S. at 385-86.
Id. at 399.
The stated purpose of the provision was to end the practice of “political strikes,”
the term given to describe the phenomena of labor stoppages called by
Communist union leaders for the sole purpose of disrupting commerce. Id. at
388-89 (describing the “great mass of material” submitted to Congress
demonstrating the problem of political strikes). The Court concluded that
considerable reasons were offered in support of the provision, and, in any event,
that it was “in no position to substitute its judgment as to the necessity or
desirability of the statute for that of Congress.” Id. at 400-01. As for the burden
on speech, the majority found that the requirement targeted a small cadre of
labor leaders “with occupancy of a position of great power over the economy of
the country.” Id. at 404.
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Finally, the Court in Dennis upheld the conviction of twelve
members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for
advocating and organizing the violent overthrow of the United States
government in violation of the Smith Act.77 The decision did not
produce a majority opinion. A plurality of four, led by Chief Justice
Vinson, relied on the clear and present danger test, as restated by
Judge Learned Hand in the appeals court opinion below.78 In a solo
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter contended that the convictions failed
the clear and present danger test.79 Until Dennis, he asserted, the
Court’s speech decisions lent constitutional support to “uncritical
libertarian generalities.”80 What troubled Frankfurter even more,
however, was the perceived absence of judicial restraint in the Court’s
free speech jurisprudence.81 “The demands of free speech in a
democratic society as well as the interest in national security,” he
wrote, “are better served by candid and informed weighing of the
competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by
announcing dogmas too inflexible for non-Euclidian problems to be
solved.”82 In line with the majority opinions in Mitchell and Douds, he
thought the legislature held the principal responsibility of weighing the

77
78

79
80
81

82

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Under the Hand-Vinson formula, courts must ask in each case “whether the
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” Id. at 510. Under the original
formulation of the clear and present danger standard, the question was “whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919).
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 527.
Id.
Justice Frankfurter faulted the justices for deviating from their “normal duty in
sitting in judgment on legislation” in cases implicating the First Amendment. Id.
at 526-7. He cited the famous footnote 4 of Carolene Products among other
examples of the Court’s disregard for its traditional, limited role in reviewing
legislation. “It has been suggested, with the casualness of a footnote,” he
complained, that legislation restricting the freedom of expression “is not
presumptively valid.” Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938)).
Id. at 524-25.
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interests,83 and insisted that courts should overrule lawmakers only in
extreme cases.84
Although Frankfurter did not attract the votes of the other justices
in Dennis, his pragmatic, anti-absolutist view of the First Amendment
characterized the Court’s jurisprudence over the following decade.
During this period, the Court routinely used the balance of interest test
in speech cases.85
C. The Balancing Critics
Balancing elicited fierce opposition from Justice Black. In a string
of dissents, Black described the legal doctrine as a “justification for
tyranny,”86 “a doctrine of governmental absolutism,”87 “freedomdestroying,”88 and a device for turning “our ‘Government of the
people, by the people and for the people’ into a government over the
people.”89 As a First Amendment textualist, Black summarized his
view in a sentence: “I read ‘no law abridging’ to mean no law
abridging.”90 That text, he argued, permanently fixed the First
Amendment’s scales on the side of free speech by putting this right
“wholly beyond the reach of federal power to abridge.”91 The framers
of the amendment, Black wrote in another opinion, already “made a
83
84

85

86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 525.
Compare id. at 539-40 (stating that laws “outside of the pale of fair judgment”
should be overturned) with United Pub. Workers of Am. (CIO) v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 102 (1947) (maintaining that laws that “pass[] beyond the general
existing conception of governmental power” will not be sustained).
The Court invoked the balancing of interests test in the following cases:
Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 9091 (1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 78 (1959) (concerning mandatory
public disclosure); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (discussing Douds and further
concerning mandatory public disclosure); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 134 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (concerning
government interrogations); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1961),
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 52 (1961) (concerning bar
membership and citing additional balancing cases).
Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. at 165.
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 111.
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 261 (1961).
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. at 67-68.
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959).
Id. at 157-58.
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choice of values.”92 According to Black, balancing invited judges to
abridge the freedom of speech whenever the values “they most highly
cherish outweigh the values most highly cherished by the Founders.”93
Black thus objected to what he understood as an effort to replace the
protections offered under the text of the First Amendment with highly
subjective judicial evaluations.
Justice Black dissented from the balancing trilogy and was joined
in dissent by Justice Douglas in two of the cases.94 The anti-balancing
camp grew with the addition to the Court of Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan. In 1961, these four justices agreed that the Court:
should not permit governmental action that plainly abridges
constitutionally protected rights of the People merely because a
majority believes that on “balance” it is better, or “wiser” to
abridge those rights than to leave them free. The inherent vice of
95
the “balancing test” is that it purports to do just that.

A diverse collection of academics also took aim at the doctrine.
First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn argued that balancing
undermined the First Amendment’s commitment to a system of selfgovernment by allowing public officials to regulate speech whenever
they deemed the restrictions as necessary to serve the greater good.96
Yale Law School Professor Thomas Emerson wrote that the doctrine
left the First Amendment without any meaning.97 If legislatures may
enact “reasonable” abridgments of free speech, the amendment
provided no protection that was not already afforded under the due
process clause.98 Professor Emerson further contended that the
doctrine left judges in an untenable position. Either they acceded to the
legislature’s weighing of the relevant issues or they assumed the
function of a legislature and reweighed the interests themselves.99
Harvard Law School Professor Charles Fried echoed Professor
92
93
94

95
96
97

98
99

Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 399 (1967).
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. at 75.
Douglas took no part in the consideration of Douds. Am. Communications
Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 415 (1950).
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 111 (1961).
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, 109-14 (1960).
Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L. J. 877, 913 (1963).
Id.
Id.
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Emerson’s sentiment that ad hoc balancing was incompatible with the
role of the judiciary.100 Professor Fried argued that courts should
instead draw “clean lines” to protect the free speech rights of the
individual.101
IV. PICKERING V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
It is widely maintained that the 1968 case of Pickering v. Board of
Education marked the arrival of the balance of interests test in cases
involving public employee free speech claims.102 This contention is
problematic for two reasons. As already discussed, the balancing test
did not originate with Pickering. More than twenty years earlier, in
Mitchell, the Court applied balancing to resolve a First Amendment
challenge to the Hatch Act brought by public employees. Second,
Pickering itself did not rely on the balance of interests test. To
recognize the reemergence of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
it is essential to understand Pickering’s actual holding.
A. Pickering’s Letter
The suit followed a series of school funding maneuvers that led to
the dismissal of a teacher, Marvin L. Pickering. In 1961, the school
board for district 205 in Will County, Illinois, submitted a pair of bond
proposals for the erection of two high schools.103 The voters rejected
the first proposal, but approved the second, authorizing $5.5 million
for the school project.104 The schools were built with the proceeds of
the bond sales.105 Three years later, the school board presented voters
with two measures that would have raised additional revenues for the
school district.106 After the first measure failed, a group of teachers
and the superintendent of schools published newspaper articles in
100

101
102

103
104
105
106

Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme
Court’s Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 773 (1963) (critiquing use of
“particularistic” balancing in the adjudication of constitutionally protected
individual liberties).
Id. at 778.
See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 565-66.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 566.
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support of increased revenues for school expenditures. Unmoved, the
voters again thwarted the tax increase.107
Two days after the defeat of the second tax proposal, Pickering
published a 900-word manifesto in the letters section of a local
newspaper.108 He blamed the school board for the defeat of the tax
measure, claiming that taxpayers lost faith in the board because it
spent lavishly on athletics at the expense of investing in the
classroom.109 Pickering dismissed the articles in favor of the tax
measure published by the teacher group as reflective of the views of
only a handful of his colleagues.110 “Did you know,” he wrote, “that
those letters had to have the approval of the superintendent before they
could be put in the paper? That’s the kind of totalitarianism teachers
live in at the high school, and your children go to school in.”111 The
school board fired Pickering two weeks after his letter was
published.112
Pickering demanded a bill of particulars and a hearing before the
board.113 The board charged that he had falsely impugned the
“motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and
competence of both the school board and the school administration,”
and that his letter threatened to disrupt faculty discipline and incite
“controversy, conflict, and dissention” in the school system and the
community.114 At the hearing, however, no evidence was presented
related to the reputations of the board members or superintendent,115
nor were any facts proven concerning the disruption of faculty
discipline or harm elsewhere due to Pickering’s letter.116 The hearing
focused instead on the truth or falsity of Pickering’s statements.117 The

107
108
109
110
111
112

113
114
115
116
117

Id.
Id. at 566, 575-78.
Id at 575-76.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 577-78.
Id. at 566; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Tp. High
School Dist., 1967 WL 113867 at *13.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1967 WL 113867 at *8.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566-67.
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
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board determined that the statements were false and upheld the
dismissal.118 The state courts affirmed.119
B. Justice Marshall’s Opinion
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Pickering addresses three issues:
whether public employees forfeit their First Amendment rights by
virtue of their employment, whether a false statement can be grounds
for dismissal, and whether other special circumstances justify the
dismissal of a public employee for speaking out on a matter of public
concern.
The first issue was straightforward. The Court had long ago
rejected the privilege doctrine and had recognized public employee
speech rights (weighed albeit against the government’s competing
interest) in several cases beginning with Mitchell.120 The lower court
in Pickering appeared nevertheless to veer into forbidden territory. It
noted that Pickering was “not a mere member of the public” since he
had opted to teach in public schools, and determined that he was
therefore bound to refrain from conduct that he otherwise “would have
an undoubted right to engage in.”121 Writing for the majority, Justice
Marshall “unequivocally rejected” the suggestion that public employee
free speech cases could be regarded as involving no more than a
condition on a governmental privilege.122
The second issue prompted the Court to jettison the balancing test
and make a threshold germaneness determination. In response to the
school board’s argument that it was justified in dismissing Pickering
for making false statements, Pickering argued that the board could not
sanction him unless it satisfied the New York Times rule.123 In New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public
official needed to show “actual malice” in order to recover in a libel
suit.124 The Court later applied the New York Times rule to criminal
defamation actions, requiring a showing of actual malice for the state

118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
Id.
United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 36 Ill. 2d 568, 577 (1967).
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1967 WL 113867 at *11, *22-*38.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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to impose sanctions for defaming public officials.125 Pickering
contended that the same rule should cover the dismissal of public
employees premised on false statements.126
Pickering asked, in essence, for a return to the unconstitutional
conditions standard that applied before the Court in Stephenson
introduced the germaneness requirement.127 He argued that the rule in
New York Times should apply to a condition on a government
privilege—his job—in the same way that the rule applied in
prosecutions of defamation seeking money damages.128 In other words,
if the New York Times rule could not be undone directly, it also could
not be undone indirectly by conditioning public employment on the
forfeiture of the protections afforded by the rule.
Marshall’s response to Pickering’s argument signaled the end, or at
least the beginning of the end, of the balancing test. At the highpoint
of interest balancing, the Court held that in scenarios such as
Pickering’s, where the state’s action “results in an indirect,
conditional, partial abridgment of speech,” the role of the Court was to
weigh the conflicting interests to determine which demanded the
greater protection.129 Marshall declined to go down this path.
Pickering may well be remembered for Marshall’s dictum about the
need for balancing.130 In actuality, however, the case was not decided
on the basis of balancing. Presented with a speech condition on public
employment, Marshall engaged in a germaneness inquiry to determine
the correct level of scrutiny. The discussion of balancing is pure dicta.
Marshall resolved the threshold question by considering whether
Pickering’s job made it necessary for him to surrender the First
Amendment protections afforded under the New York Times rule.131
The content of the letter showed that it was not.132 The statements that
Pickering made, Marshall asserted, were not “directed towards any
person with whom [Pickering] would normally be in contact in the
125
126
127
128
129
130

131
132

Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1967 WL 113867 at *11.
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1967 WL 113867 at *16, *19-*20.
Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950).
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968).
Id. at 567.
Id. at 569.
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course of his daily work as a teacher,” and thus there was “no question
of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony
among coworkers.”133 Marshall further recognized that Pickering
wrote the letter about the board members, with whom Pickering lacked
“the kind of close working relationships for which it can persuasively
be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their
proper functioning.”134 Pickering’s statements about athletic funding,
moreover, did not concern “matters so closely related to the day-to-day
operations of the schools.”135 Had Pickering disclosed sensitive
information, Marshall suggested that a less protective speech rule
would have been appropriate given that the school would have found it
difficult to rebut the statements “because of the teacher’s presumed
greater access to real facts.”136 Nothing in the letter, however,
convinced Marshall that denial of the New York Times rule was
appropriate in light of Pickering’s employment.
Pickering prevailed on the threshold question. “[I]n a case such as
the present one,” Marshall concluded, “in which the fact of
employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the
subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher, we
conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the
general public that he seeks to be.”137 The New York Times rule thus
controlled. The threshold determination was all but dispositive.
Because the board presented no evidence that Pickering had made any
of the objectionable statements with actual malice, an essential
element under the controlling rule, the Court found no grounds for his
dismissal and reversed the ruling below.138
Courts and commentators, of course, have read Pickering as
establishing a balancing test.139 This interpretation, however, neglects
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 569-70.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
For the courts’ reception of Pickering, see, e.g., Bernasconi v. Tempe
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 548 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1977) (concluding that
under Pickering the court “must strike the balance” between competing
interests); Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 1976) (considering
whether public employee’s comments on matters of public concern “tilt[ed] the
Pickering balance in favor of first amendment protection”); Paulos v. Breier,
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the decision’s actual holding, which Justice Marshall reiterated at the
end of the opinion: “In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent
proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a
teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance
may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment.”140 Thomas Emerson pointed out that the Pickering
opinion “ultimately seems to rest upon those considerations relevant to
the question whether the publication of Pickering’s letter was
incompatible with his commitments as an employee in the school
system.”141 Emerson was right—a conclusion bolstered by the fact that
Justice Black, a balancing Geiger counter, did not object to any
claimed use of balancing in the majority opinion.142 Outside of the
public employment context, the Supreme Court has referred to
Pickering as an unconstitutional conditions case.143

140
141
142

143

507 F.2d 1383, 1385 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing Pickering for the proposition that a
“balance must be struck between the First Amendment interests of a state
employee and the interests of the state in promoting the efficiency of the public
services that it performs through its employees” ); Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d
1334, 1336 (4th Cir. 1974) (providing that Pickering “necessitates a weighing of
interest[s]”); Moore v. Winfield City Bd. of Educ., 452 F.2d 726, 728 (5th Cir.
1971) (maintaining that under Pickering, a public employee’s speech rights
“must be balanced against the need for orderly” public administration). For the
scholarly treatment of the case, see, e.g., Schoen, supra note 9, at 8
(summarizing Pickering as holding that public employee speech claims must be
resolved by interest balancing); Solomon, supra note 11, at 453 (stating that
Pickering announced a balancing test to evaluate public employee speech
claims); Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76
MICH. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1977) (same).
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 581 (1970).
In Pickering, Black joined a brief concurrence filed by Justice Douglas. These
justices wrote separately to restate their view that the New York Times rule was
not sufficiently protective of free speech. Pickering, 391 at U.S. 563. The
concurrence did not mention the majority’s invocation of a balancing test. See
id. Black concurred separately in cases in which the justices sustained a free
speech claim on the basis of balancing, see e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 156-57 (1959), suggesting that he did not view balancing as the standard
applied in Pickering.
Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (citing Pickering as an
example of the “well-settled” unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
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V. THE RETURN OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS ANALYSIS
Before Pickering, the public employee free speech cases that
reached the Supreme Court revolved around the liberties and duties of
dissenters in Cold War America. Loyalty oaths, anti-Communist
affidavits, and conscientious objectors were recurring themes in these
cases.144 Pickering, by contrast, could hardly have concerned a set of
facts farther removed from an Arthur Miller drama, and was more in
line with the ordinary, everyday controversies of politics and public
life—school funding, athletic facilities, a bond issue, and the allocation
of taxpayer dollars by government administrators.145 If Pickering did
not produce a genuine doctrinal change, the case did very much signal
the mainstreaming of the First Amendment.
Part V of this Article examines four categories of public employee
speech cases that have reached the Supreme Court since Pickering:
political patronage and activity cases, publishing and public speaking
cases, public-sector union dues cases, and insubordinate employee
cases. If these cases, like Pickering, do not raise the type of existential
questions that fueled the sharp fissures between “Frankfurtean”
pragmatists and “Blackean” absolutists on the Cold War Court, they
demonstrate the wide array of public employee speech problems that
the mainstreaming of the First Amendment has brought.
Notwithstanding this diversity, the modern Court has relied
consistently on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to resolve
public employee speech cases.
A. Political Affiliation and Activity
After Pickering, the Court decided a line of cases involving
government workers and contactors who argued that patronage
practices were an infringement on their right to free speech. The first
of these cases, Elrod v. Burns, arose from the home of a long tradition
of machine politics—Cook County, Illinois.146 In 1970, the voters of
Cook County elected a new sheriff, Richard J. Elrod, who promptly
144

145
146

HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 301-391 (1988) (discussing the
anti-Communist cases).
See generally Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565-68.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); for background on Cook County politics,
see generally MIKE ROYKO, BOSS: RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO (1971)
(describing Cook County under the leadership of Chicago mayor and Cook
County Democratic Party chairman Richard J. Daley).
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dismissed, or threatened to dismiss, employees who refused to join or
support the Democratic Party.147 Three former employees and one
current employee facing discharge brought a First Amendment
challenge.148
The Court ruled in favor of the employees but split on the
rationale. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion maintained that a
condition on public employment that infringes on free speech must be
the least restrictive means to a vital government purpose and “the
benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected
rights.”149 Justice Stewart’s concurrence, joined by Justice Blackmun,
stated that the sole question presented in the case was whether a nonpolicymaking government employee may be discharged “from a job
that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political
beliefs.”150
Four years later, in Branti v. Finkel,151 the Court reaffirmed Elrod
but clarified that germaneness is the dispositive factor. The suit was
brought by two Republican public defenders after the newly installed
Democratic county public defender discharged them to make room for
Democratic appointees.152 The majority opinion by Justice Stevens
explained that the standard for determining the constitutionality of
patronage discharges “is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved.”153 The Branti Court found
no reason for restricting appointments to the public defender’s office
to members of the “in-party.”154 A public defender, Stevens
maintained, discharges his or her public duties by serving the
undivided interests of individual clients.155 Interposing a partyaffiliation requirement, thus, undermines the public defender’s ability
to do his or her job effectively.156
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Elrod, 427 U.S. at 350-51.
Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 375.
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 518.
See id. at 519-20.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 519-20.
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The Branti standard remains controlling. In 1996, the Court
extended the protection against adverse action on the basis of political
affiliation to government contractors.157 The majority opinion in that
case began by quoting the language from the Branti holding that
political affiliation must be an “appropriate” requirement.158 The Court
further held that the government must base its contracting decisions on
legitimate, performance-based criteria, and not on the political beliefs
of the contractors.159
The constitutionality of conditions preventing partisan activities by
government employees is the flip side of the patronage decisions. In
1973, the Court in United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO reaffirmed its decision in
Mitchell, discussed in the previous section, and upheld the Hatch
Act.160 Letter Carriers does not provide a clear answer as to whether
the Court viewed a balancing of interests test or unconstitutional
conditions analysis as the appropriate method for reaching a decision.
Justice White’s majority opinion sustaining the prohibition largely
followed precedent rather than either of these approaches.161 To the
extent that Letter Carriers subjected the Hatch Act to a fresh review,
however, the opinion relied on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.162 As in the patronage cases, the Court framed the issue in
terms of the means-end fit between the speech restriction and the
purported government interest.163 In the patronage cases, the Court
concluded that political affiliation is not an appropriate criterion for
157
158
159
160
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O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
Id. at 719.
Id. at 725-26.
U. S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973).
White began his discussion of the merits by remarking that the “judgment of
history” favored restricting the partisan activities of public servants. Id. at 557.
He proceeded to cite examples of governmental policies prohibiting such
activities stretching back to the Jefferson Administration. Id. at 557-59. The
majority opinion further noted that the Supreme Court had twice before upheld
restrictions on the political activities of federal employees, including an earlier
challenge to the Hatch Act in Mitchell. Id. at 554-55 (discussing Mitchell and Ex
parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882)). Given the opportunity to revisit Mitchell, the
majority decided to reaffirm it “unhesitatingly.” Id. at 556.
See id. at 564.
Id.
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many government jobs.164 In Letter Carriers, the Court ruled that
prohibiting partisan activity by government workers, on the other
hand, is “essential” to “this great end of Government—the impartial
execution of the laws.”165 The Court explained that the restriction
stunted the growth of political machines inside public bureaucracies,
and excused public employees from having to curry political favor
with their superiors.166 A necessary part of the effective operation of
government, the majority further asserted, is maintaining the
appearance of impartially.167 The prohibition was thus germane to
government employment because government employees who
campaigned for elected officials gave the impression of partiality.
B. Publishing and Public Speaking
In Snepp v. United States, the Court affirmed the validity of the
CIA’s prepublication review process for intelligence-related
materials.168 The case revolved around the book, “Decent Interval,”
which Frank Snepp wrote about his tenure as an intelligence officer in
Vietnam.169 In violation of his employment contract, Snepp submitted
the book manuscript for publication without submitting it to the CIA
for prior review and approval.170 He argued that the prepublication
clearance process was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. 171
The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the process for two reasons,
both of which pertained to germaneness. The Court declared that the
provision was necessary to prevent unauthorized disclosure and to
164
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See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); see also O’Hare Truck Services, Inc.
v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-55.
Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 565.
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
Id. at 507-08, 516-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 507.
The district court and appellate courts rejected this argument, but disagreed as to
the remedy for Snepp’s breach. The district court imposed a constructive trust
on Snepp’s profits for the benefit of the CIA. United States v. Snepp, 456 F.
Supp. 176, 181-82 (E.D. Va. 1978). The court of appeals struck this remedy, but
held that the CIA was entitled to seek punitive damages. United States v. Snepp,
595 F.2d 926, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court agreed with the
district court and remanded the case for the reinstatement of the constructive
trust. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515.
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maintain the “appearance of confidentiality,” which was essential to
the continued availability of foreign sources of information.172 The
restriction was thus closely related to the CIA’s operational
effectiveness.173
Other government workers fared better with respect to a federal
law that prohibited them from receiving honoraria for appearances,
speeches, and articles.174 In United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union, unlike in Snepp, the Court found no relationship between the
speech restriction and the government’s ability to operate
effectively.175 There was no cognizable link between the honorarium
ban and the need to maintain employee discipline or morale.176 Nor
was the restriction related to the government’s interest in avoiding the
appearance of impropriety. In the case of a single event, speech, or
article, the law applied even if the subject matter was unrelated to the
government worker’s official duties or status.177 There is “scant harm,”
Justice Stevens concluded for the majority, “or appearance of harm,
resulting from [a government worker]’s accepting pay to lecture on the
Quaker religion or to write dance reviews.”178 Stevens further
172
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178

Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n. 3. As the district judge explained: “It is elementary
that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an
effective national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy. Other nations
can hardly deal with this nation in an atmosphere of mutual trust unless they can
be assured that their confidence will be kept.” Snepp, 456 F. Supp. at 181.
Three justices dissented from the Court’s decision to impose a constructive trust
as a remedy for the contract breach. See Snepp¸444 U.S. at 516-26 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters acknowledged, however, that the prepublication
clearance may be constitutional in view of “the national interest in maintaining
an effective intelligence service,” but chided the majority for resolving this
question summarily, without the benefit of full briefing and oral argument.
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 526 n. 17 (Stevens J., dissenting).
See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
See id at 477.
Id. at 470-71.
See id. at 459-60. The law contained an exception, which permitted the receipt
of honoraria for a series of appearances, speeches, and articles, provided that
there was no nexus between the subject matter of the series and the public
employee’s official duties or status. Id. (quoting statute). The exception negated
the government’s argument that the honoraria ban was justified to save the costs
of conducting a case by case nexus analysis because that same analysis was
necessary to determine if a government employee who gave a series of speeches
could accept an honorarium. Id. at 474.
Id. at 473.
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suggested that the statute might have passed muster if the ban applied
only to subject matter related to a government employee’s job,179 but
he declined to rewrite the statute from the bench. The ban failed, in
sum, for the same reason that the CIA’s prepublication clearance
regime survived—germaneness.
C. Public-Sector Union Dues
The Court’s consideration of the constitutionality of mandatory
public-sector union dues began with a balance that was already struck.
As in Letter Carriers, which addressed a renewed challenge to the
Hatch Act, the Court was not writing on a blank slate. Before
Pickering, the justices decided Railway Employees’ Department v.
Hanson180 and Machinists v. Street,181 a pair of cases that addressed
mandatory private-sector union dues. When the Court first entertained
a challenge to mandatory public-sector union dues in 1977, in Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education, a majority of the justices described
Hanson and Street as “go[ing] far to resolve the issue.”182
In these earlier cases, the Court affirmed the use of mandatory
union dues for the limited purpose of collective bargaining. Both cases
concerned the Railway Labor Act (RLA)’s union-shop provision,
which authorized carriers and unions to require union membership as a
condition of employment.183 A private agreement between workers
and management typically does not create the necessary conditions for
a First Amendment injury.184 The RLA, however, implicated Congress
because the statute expressly preempted state “right-to-work” laws that
otherwise would have protected the right of workers to refuse to join a
union.185 In Hanson, employees from a “right-to-work” state
challenged a private union shop arrangement. 186 They argued that the
First Amendment excused them from paying union dues to support
179
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See id. at 474 (referring to the “undesirable nexus between the speaker’s official
duties and either the subject matter of the speaker’s expression or the identity of
the payor”).
Railway Employees’ Dep’t. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
Int’l Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. 431 U.S. 209, 217 (1977).
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 228-29; Street, 367 U.S. at 742.
See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 227-28.
Id. at 228-29 (quoting statute’s preemption language).
Id. at 227-28.
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political and ideological causes that they opposed. The Court upheld
the union shop arrangement but cautioned that its holding was limited
to dues attributable to the union’s collective-bargaining work.187 In
Street, the employees proved that the union exceeded this narrow
authorization and used employee dues for political causes.188 The
Court, however, did not reach the First Amendment issue. It held
instead that the RLA prohibited the use of dues for political purposes,
and therefore, the employer’s actions were illegal under the statute.189
The Abood Court read Hanson and Street to hold that mandatory
union dues were “constitutionally justified by the legislative
assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the
system of labor relations established by Congress.”190 The Court
explained that the central element in the RLA was the system of
exclusive union representation that it established.191 Under this system,
employees designate a single collective-bargaining representative,
which, the Court asserted, streamlines labor-management negotiations.
The Court further noted that the collective-bargaining agent is
obligated to represent every member of a bargaining unit equally,
union member or not.192 Requiring every member of a bargaining unit
to defray the costs of collective-bargaining, the Court explained, “has
been thought to distribute fairly the costs” among those who benefit
from collective-bargaining, thereby avoiding the problem of freeridership.193
Turning to the case in question, the Abood Court noted that the
State of Michigan adopted an essentially identical structure for labormanagement relations as that which existed under the RLA.194 State
law provided for exclusive representation, a duty of fair representation,
and authorized collective-bargaining agents to collect agency fees
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The Court suggested that it would not have upheld the use of union dues for
political purposes but that the employees submitted no evidence that the union
devoted dues to this end. Id. at 238.
Street, 367 U.S. at 744.
Id. at 770.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
Id. 220-21.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 221-22.
Id. at 223 (Douglas, J. concurring).
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from members of a bargaining unit.195 The Court found that the
governmental interests which justified the imposition of agency fees
under the RLA were equally relevant in the public sector,196 and that
public-sector workers did not have a stronger First Amendment right
than their private-sector counterparts to avoid these fees.197
Abood was not contested until 2014, in Harris v. Quinn.198 The
challengers were personal assistants who provided in-home care to
persons suffering from disabilities.199 The State of Illinois paid the
personal assistants through two state programs subsidized by
Medicaid.200 Under the same basic arrangement that existed in the
RLA cases and Abood, an exclusive agent represented the personal
assistants in collective-bargaining negotiations with the state, and
extracted fees from all personal assistants, including the challengers, to
defray the agency costs related to these negotiations. 201 The
challengers asserted that the mandatory assessments were
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.202
Justice Alito’s majority opinion viewed Abood as upholding
mandatory agency fees because they were related to the state’s
authority to negotiate the employment terms of state employees with a
single representative who bargains for all similarly-situated public
employees.203 Under this theory, the mandatory agency fees are no
more than the union’s costs of complying with the state’s mandate:204
the state has decided that it desires to execute and administer
employment contracts with public employees through a single
representative and the employee’s representative will be compensated
in this manner.
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Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 230-31.
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
Id. at 2626 and n.3.
Id. at 2624.
Id. at 2626.
Id. at 2627.
See id. at 2631.
See id. at 2636 (citing Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) for
the proposition that “what justifies the agency fees . . . is the fact that the State
compels the union to promote and protect the interest of nonmembers”).
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In Harris, however, Justice Alito determined that the situation was
quite different. The mandatory dues were not germane to the state’s
desire to negotiate employment terms through a single source because
the state afforded the union virtually nothing to negotiate with regard
to the employment terms of the personal assistants.205 The personal
assistants were paid a uniform hourly wage set by statute, and were
ineligible to receive statutory retirement and health insurance benefits
as well as a host of other benefits available to state employees.206
Subject to minimal baseline requirements, individual clients had
complete discretion to hire the personal assistant of their choosing.207
The duties of the personal assistants were established in a plan that
needed the approval of a client and the client’s physician, but not the
state.208 Personal assistants worked at the pleasure of their clients, who
could terminate the employment relationship without permission from
the state.209 And in the event that a personal assistant wished to protest
the terms and conditions set by a client, there was no grievance
procedure involving the union.210 There was, in short, no necessary
link between the agency fees and the union’s collective bargaining
work.
As in Stephenson and Pickering, the germaneness inquiry in Harris
determined the level of scrutiny. Once Justice Alito determined that
the agency fees were not connected to the state’s authority over the
conduct of collective bargaining in the public sector, he subjected the
fee arrangement to First Amendment scrutiny and ruled it
unconstitutional.211
Harris did not reach the larger issue of whether a system of
genuine collective bargaining in the public sector is germane to the
effective operation of government. In other words, the majority did not
resolve the case of the public employee who argues that the union may
not collect agency fees because mandatory collective bargaining, like
most patronage practices, serves no real governmental purpose. Abood
still controls there. The majority in Harris suggested, however, that
205
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See id. at 2642-43.
Id. at 2634-36.
Id. at 2634.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2637.
Id. at 2640-41.
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Abood was too hasty in adopting the industrial peace rationale from
two railway cases decided more than sixty years ago, and that
mandatory public-sector unionism, unlike its private-sector
counterpart, has been principally responsible for the “mushroom[ing]”
of employee wages and benefits paid for by taxpayers.212
D. Insubordinate Employees
The government occasionally takes adverse action against
employees based on something that they have said. Consistent with the
doctrinal trend discussed thus far, the Supreme Court has shown little
enthusiasm in these cases for weighing the competing interests and
determining whether the speech is protected when applying the
balancing test. The Court has gone so far as devising a threshold
requirement—the public-concern test—that must be satisfied before
Pickering’s putative balancing test is triggered.
The Court articulated the public-concern test in Connick v. Myers,
a 1983 case concerning an assistant district attorney, Sheila Myers,
who was fired after she protested an impending transfer by circulating
a questionnaire among employees.213 Among other things, the
questionnaire queried views on the office’s transfer policy, morale,
and whether the line prosecutors had confidence in their superiors,
who were listed by name.214
In a 5-4 ruling, Connick held that the First Amendment is not
implicated every time a public employer takes an adverse employment
action against an employee based on the employee’s speech.215 Public
employees, the Court maintained, had no free speech claim where the
expression at issue did not concern “any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.”216 Connick further provided that
whether an expression touched on a public concern depended on the
“content, form, and context” of the expression.217
Turning to the statements at issue, the Court held that all but one of
the items on Myers’s survey failed the public-concern test. Only the
Myers’s query as to whether employees had felt pressured to campaign
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id. at 2630-32.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983).
Id. at 140, app. A.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
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for candidates supported by the district attorney’s office touched on an
issue of public concern.218 Even though the Court reasoned that this
lone statement gave Myers a viable First Amendment interest, the
strength of that interest was greatly diminished by the Court’s
conclusion that the questionnaire essentially concerned a private
matter, an intramural personnel dispute prompted by an employee’s
dissatisfaction with her pending transfer. 219 “Government offices,” the
Court warned, “could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter.”220 Myers’s limited First Amendment
right was not sufficiently compelling to require the district attorney to
stand by while Myers distributed a survey that reasonably threatened
the efficient operations of the prosecutor’s office, the Court
concluded.221
Connick’s public-concern test is problematic for two reasons. First,
as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the Court rejected the publicconcern test less than a decade prior in another First Amendment
context.222 In New York Times, as earlier discussed, the Court held that
the First Amendment required public officials to show actual malice to
prevail in defamation actions.223 Later, the Court extended the New
York Times rule to public figures.224 Then, in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., a plurality of the Court would have extended the
protections of the New York Times rule to any expression about an
issue of public concern.225 Three years later, however, the Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. rejected the public-concern test as a tool
for determining the applicability of the New York Times rule in state
libel suits.226 Connick did not explain why the public-concern test was
appropriate in light of Gertz.
218
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Id. at 149.
Id. at 148 (describing Myers’s questionnaire as a “mere extension” of her
dissatisfaction with the transfer, and as an effort to “gather ammunition for
another round of controversy with her superiors”).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 163-64 (noting rejection of the public-concern test in Myers, just as Justice
Brennan had held in his landmark decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.).
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
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Second, the test is self-contradictory. The distinction between
issues of public and private concern is rooted in the notion that speech
related to public concerns is essential to self-government and therefore
deserving of heighted protection. The public-concern test, however,
undermines self-government by allowing courts to function as the
ultimate arbiters of what constitutes an issue of public concern. In the
words of Justice Marshall’s dissent in Rosenbloom, later quoted by the
majority in Gertz, the test requires courts “to somehow pass on the
legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject” and to determine
“what information is relevant to self-government.”227 As Professor
Robert Post concluded, the public-concern test “displaces the very
democratic processes it seeks to facilitate.”228
The Court in Connick, moreover, had other means available for
preventing the over-constitutionalization of public employment
disputes. Using the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court
could have ruled that Myers’s survey was incompatible with her duties
as a public prosecutor. Employment in the public sector entails
forgoing the right to respond to management’s personnel decisions by
creating a “mini-insurrection,” as Myers apparently did, within the
office.229 The Connick Court could have relied on the unconstitutional
conditions reasoning in Pickering. The Court concluded that the
teacher was entitled to First Amendment protection because there was
“no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors
or harmony among coworkers.”230 The school district’s reprisal against
his letter, in other words, was not germane to the state’s legitimate
interest in the efficient and effective provision of the benefit of public
education. In Connick, by contrast, there was, at least arguably, a
nexus between Myers’s termination and the state’s non-speech related
interest in the efficient operation of a public service. The use of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine would have removed the need for
the court to assign itself the authority of determining what expressions
are of public importance.
227

228

229
230

Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339, 346 (quoting Justice
Marshall’s dissent in Rosenbloom).
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 601, 672 (1990).
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141, 151, & n.11.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. Of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S.
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The cases that followed Connick lend credence to Professor Post’s
claim that there is no “principled method” for applying the publicconcern test.231 In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court held that a deputy
constable addressed a matter of public concern when she remarked,
after hearing of the attempted assassination on President Reagan, “If
they go for him again, I hope they get him.”232 In City of San Diego v.
Roe, the public-concern determination went the other way where a
police officer was fired for marketing sexually explicit videos on the
Internet.233 Roe defined a matter of public concern as “something that
is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of
publication.”234 It is difficult to see how an employee’s expressed
approval of the president’s assassination could be of any greater
“value” to the public than the sexually explicit videos made by the
police officer in Roe. Both would seem to be of no value to democratic
self-government.
The outcomes in Rankin and Roe are better grounded under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. In Rankin, the Court reasoned
that a speech restriction on a private expression is unlikely to be
germane to certain public jobs.235 Where “an employee serves no
confidential, policymaking, or public contact role,” the Court
explained, “the danger to the agency’s successful functioning from that
employee’s private speech is minimal.”236 The deputy constable’s sole
responsibility was entering information into a computer.237 She was
not in contact with the public during working hours and did not wear a
uniform or carry a gun.238 Since the comment regarding the
assassination of President Reagan was made privately, 239 the Court
could have reasonably concluded that it was not incompatible with the
deputy constable’s purely clerical duties. By this line of reasoning, the
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Post, supra note 228, at 673.
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987).
City of San Diego, v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 389-91.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 380-81, 392 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 389.
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public employer’s reprisal for the remark amounted to an
unconstitutional burden on her employment.
In Roe, by contrast, the Court found that the sexually explicit
videos were made widely available and depicted the officer in a police
uniform performing indecent acts in the course of official duties. 240 In
this way, the public employee’s speech brought the professionalism of
the department’s officers into “serious disrepute,” and “was
detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer.”241 Thus, the
sanction for distributing the lewd videos was germane to the city’s
legitimate non-speech interest in maintaining the reputation and image
of its police department.
The Court’s tendency to obscure the application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine was apparent once again in
Garcetti v. Ceballos. 242 The Court held here that the First Amendment
did not protect public employees from adverse employment action
based on speech made pursuant to their public duties.243 The case arose
from a disagreement between Richard Ceballos and his supervisors
over a pending prosecution.244 Ceballos, a deputy prosecutor, wrote
two memos recommending the dismissal of a case based on his review
of the evidence and conversations with the affiant for a critical search
warrant.245 The supervisors rejected the recommendation.246 Ceballos
then testified for the defense in a hearing on its motion to quash the
search warrant.247 The judge ruled in favor of the prosecution on the
motion, and Ceballos was later transferred and denied a promotion.248
Without weighing the value of Ceballos’s speech, the Court
declared that it was entitled to no First Amendment protection. 249 The
“controlling factor” was that Ceballos made the statements as part of
his job.250 Commentators widely criticized the holding as marking a
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new departure from Pickering’s putative balancing standard.251 The
outcome in Ceballos is explicable, however, under the now familiar
unconstitutional conditions principles. Unlike in Pickering, Rankin,
and Roe, the speech in question in Ceballos owed its existence to the
government.252 The government created the position of calendar
deputy, and was free, therefore, under the constitutional conditions
doctrine to impose any conditions on calendar deputies that were
germane to the effective performance of the position. The relevant
condition in the case required Ceballos, as calendar deputy, to accept
the work-related feedback given by his supervisors. This condition is
commonplace in all forms of employment. It is germane to the
employer’s purpose in providing the job in the first place. Supervisory
control over work-related tasks reasonably ensures that the requested
work is done professionally, in accordance with the standards set by
the employer. Imagine if a judge could not discipline a law clerk who
repeatedly turned in work products that disagreed with the judge’s
interpretation of the law. Indeed, government employers need not be
required to engage in “guerilla war” with subordinates over the
discharge of public duties.253
VI. CONCLUSION
Public employee speech problems have been called a “first
amendment nightmare.”254 Realistically assessing the controlling
standard is a helpful first step in addressing the array of First
Amendment questions that continue to arise in the government
employment context. This Article has argued that there has long been a
gap between what the Supreme Court says and what it does in public
employee speech cases. The Court invokes the language of balancing
but follows the logic of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The
proper way to understand the Court’s public employee speech
jurisprudence is as a series of cases that determine the conditions
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See, e.g., Cooper, supra, note 60 at 90-91 (critiquing the Court for not applying
Pickering balancing and characterizing the speaker-as-citizen requirement as
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Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory
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under which the First Amendment will apply. When the guarantees of
the First Amendment control, a public employee has a relatively easy
time in prevailing. It is getting to the First Amendment that is the
tricky part, perhaps as it should be.

